

6-7262

12 March 1955

The Honorable William F. Knowland  
United States Senate  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Following your suggestion at luncheon the other day, I have reviewed the article by Ferreus, originally printed in the October 1954 issue of the REVIEW OF POLITICS under the heading "Courage or Perdition? -- The 14 Fundamental Facts of the Nuclear Age." I find it very interesting and thought provoking and am passing it on to others here in the shop.

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

HIM: mah

Rewritten: AWD/c

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 March 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable William F. Knowland  
United States Senate  
Washington 25, D. C.

*Bill -*  
Dear ~~Senator Knowland~~:

Following your suggestion at luncheon the other day, I have reviewed the article by Ferreus, originally printed in the October 1954 issue of the REVIEW OF POLITICS under the heading "Courage or Perdition? -- The 14 Fundamental Facts of the Nuclear Age," and I find it very interesting and thought provoking.

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DATE: 30/00/00 REVIEWER:   
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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR JULLES

You asked that  prepare a study of Sen. Knowland's "extended remarks" in Congressional Record. The Record is also attached.

*V.H.L.*  
*[Signature]*

7 March 1955  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 76-2

DATE: 30 APR 1981

REVIEWER:

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THE 14 FUNDAMENTAL FACTS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE

1. The inevitability of the nucleonic age and the emergency of nuclear industrial potentials is the first fundamental fact which we must grasp firmly.
2. International control would be possible only as a sham and, if adopted, would constitute an extreme and unacceptable security hazard.
3. Soviet talk about control is designed to disarm the United States and enhance the nuclear posture of world communism.
4. While the historical Alexanders, Napoleons, and Hitlers were pitiable illusionists, the atomically armed future aggressor may be the greatest military realist of all times, and hence end up as the first true world conqueror in history.
5. Nuclear weapons are the key of modern military power, and hence the irreplaceable key to American security.
6. The nuclear problem is not susceptible to solutions by legal agreement, nor by any other trick aiming at the evanescence of nuclear weapons.
7. Insufficient forces in being and inadequate quantities of modern weapons, as well as poor command, alliance and decision-making structures which are not responsive to the requirements of rapid modern war, constitute an invitation to nuclear death, especially so since in a modern war the first battle may decide the outcome of the entire conflict.
8. Future wars hardly will be fought with weapons ordered and produced after the start of hostilities.
9. Phony security is the excessive hazard in the present phase of the nuclear age.
10. Industrial application of nuclear energy offers an excellent chance for the social strengthening of the free world.
11. To satisfy this need, undoubtedly, additional research funds may be required but more important still would be the streamlining of overly long and constructed bureaucratic channels. American technological and industrial time lags are too long.
12. Shall we consider the need to weaken, modify, or replace the Soviet Government to be the 12th basic fact of the nuclear age?
13. Only one thing is worse than nuclear war: Defeat in such a war.
14. In any event, in proclaiming good intentions of peacefulness with respect to future wars we are forced to look hard at the 14th fact of the atomic age which, perhaps, is the most ominous of all: That in an atomic conflict the force which plans to strike second never may be in a position to strike at all.



United States  
of America

# Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 84<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 101

WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1955

No. 35

True, the mere existence of nuclear industries or even of atomic weapons does not by itself pose a security threat. This threat arises only when such weapons are in the hands of the politically immoral and uninhibited, and more particularly, in the hands of governments or political (and criminal) groups willing to employ such weapons for the blackmail or destruction of their opponents. It may be argued that, given governmental encouragement to the present tendency of society to decentralize, and given some efforts to reduce the vulnerability of factories and cities, the relative effectiveness of nuclear weapons could be reduced. It also may be argued that the employment of nuclear weapons could reduce war to a single battle of a few days' duration and that, while casualties in this battle would be very heavy, total casualties would be smaller than those resulting from a hypothetical protracted war fought without nuclear weapons. In comparison with wars of previous centuries, a nuclear war indeed need not be more destructive of human lives than, let us say, the Thirty Years' War (which, admittedly, would be scant solace). However, these arguments may be countered with equally, and perhaps more, cogent objections. In the end, the disputants should agree easily that wars in general, and nuclear wars in particular, are most unpleasant occurrences which all of us must make strong efforts to avoid. Hence the question arises: granting the inevitable existence of nuclear capabilities are there feasible methods for avoiding a nuclear holocaust?

A nuclear monopoly in the hands of an aggressive dictator certainly would have spelled doom for much of mankind. If, by the end of the Second World War, Stalin had possessed such a monopoly in the form of a significant weapons stockpile, he would have been able to establish a Soviet world domination; in all likelihood, he would have proceeded to do so. Or we may ask ourselves what might have happened if the Nazis had come into possession of an operational stockpile of atomic weapons prior to the Normandy invasion? Had not the United States achieved the first atomic stockpile in history, human society would have suffered the worst catastrophe in its history. Let us be grateful that this disaster was spared us.

If an aggressor were to use nuclear weapons in the future, he would do so in the expectancy of retaliation in kind. We probably are entitled to make some rationalistic assumption with respect to human nature, including the psychology of aggressors. If we assume then, that aggressors aim at the fruits of war but dare shoulder only the minimum of sacrifice, we should expect that in the face of a deadly retaliatory threat, aggressors might abstain from the employment of nuclear weapons. Yet this expectation cannot be firm because the aggressor may be able to neutralize, by military or political means, the capability or willingness of his opponents to retaliate; and secondly, because he may be a madman (in the clinical sense), and hence not be rationally mindful of the consequences of his acts—in fact, depopulation and the creation of ruin and chaos may be his primary objectives. Hence the concept that atomic attack is preventable through the threat of retaliation, while probably valid in general, cannot be relied upon in all and any circumstances.

There is a school of thought which denies that security against atomic destruction can be obtained at all through retaliatory threat. The fear is that retaliation would compound the evil. In different variants and mixtures, it is proposed that the supervised destruction of existing stockpiles and the establishment of an international control apparatus be undertaken in order to prevent the future production of nuclear weapons. Perpetual international control is the heart of this concept; its purpose is to make nuclear war

impossible through nuclear disarmament. There have been numerous schemes setting forth infallible and effective control arrangements. Many ingenious ideas have been proposed to provide for the closing of the loopholes which, invariably, appeared after a particular scheme had been analyzed closely.

The drawing of utopias has been the favorite pastime of our nuclear Morus, Campanellas, and Bellamies. It is amazing that such cerebrations have arrested the attention of political scientists and even of practicing statesmen (if we assume their attention was genuine). No less startling is the fact that discussions about such schemes usually ignore the practical difficulties which would arise even in the unlikely event of an international agreement undertaken in truly good faith.

Let us look at three of these practical difficulties.

1. Effective atomic control probably would entail the direct watching of no less than 100,000 industrial firms and factories the world over; hence at least 300,000 technically qualified inspectors would have to be assigned to the control of existing facilities. In reality, this world-wide requirement would be considerably larger and in addition to supervising industrial enterprises it would be necessary to control many other economic activities, such as mining, trading, laboratory research, etc. I doubt that there are in the world enough technically—and linguistically—qualified persons to undertake such a task. (In the United States only 7,400 persons received master of arts and doctor of philosophy degrees in engineering and physical sciences during 1952.)

No elaborate statistics are necessary to show that commitment of such a corps of inspectors would swallow a large percentage of the world's scientists and technicians. While on control assignments, these men would be taken away from their primary professions. One can but picture the effect on future scientific progress. Yet if volunteers were not forthcoming in adequate numbers, personnel would have to be drafted, and this not just for a short emergency. The loyalty and the reliability of drafted inspectors probably would not rate very high. Since, actually, the world's entire technical economy must be supervised, literally every qualified citizen would have to become a part-time policeman. Even in this improbable case a modern state would possess enough resources and wits to outwit the honest inspectors, bribe the dishonest ones, blind the attention of the disaffected, and enlist the willing or forced cooperation of the ideologists and political careerists.

2. To avoid secret preparations in out-of-the-way places and uninhabited areas, approximately 30 million square miles would have to be supervised, with at least half of this area requiring frequent and close looks. This type of massive supervision can be done only through aerial reconnaissance. Assuming a range of aircraft of 1,000 miles and a photographic coverage per sortie of a 2-mile strip, 15,000 aircraft sorties would be necessary for a single supervision or if a weekly check is desired, as it must, about 780,000 sorties per year. This estimate neglects additional sorties necessitated by bad weather and the need to survey sea areas, and it does not take into account the responsibility of following up suspected violations with detailed checks and precision photography obtainable only through large numbers of low-level flights (and conceivably through airborne landings). With maintenance, repair, and loss, approximately 8,450 aircraft and about 2 million men as well as very substantial photographic facilities would be required to do just the basic job. With such an investment and flying, it still would be possible—easily possible—to fool the air patrol: many infractions would be feasible in tunnels, underground installations, and even in innocent-looking city houses. Needless to say, such a global air patrol would deprive every security in non-nuclear weapons. Hence the patrol can be instituted only after states no longer are required to have military and industrial secrets. If so, would the air patrol not be superfluous?

Future technology, however, may modify the above requirements for control flights. With better aircraft, enlarged airbase systems, and broader photographic coverage, the job may be done with fewer sorties. Substantial increases in commercial flying gradually may restrict the area which needs to be controlled. Still, the cost of the inspectors corps and the air patrol may be estimated at approximately \$18 to \$20 billion yearly as compared to the current budget of the United Nations of less than \$50 million. Unquestionably, the United States would have to pay the lion's share of this budget. More significant perhaps, only the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom would be able to make available adequate air facilities and personnel for the purpose. The air patrol would be an almost exclusive responsibility of the super powers. Let us be content with the remark that such a state of affairs would present very great political hazards.

3. Nuclear weapons already are in existence. Before an agreement conceivably can be negotiated, there will be large weapons stockpiles in many countries. How on earth can it be assured that all these weapons would be destroyed and the sizeable numbers of "insurance weapons" would not be hidden? Yet if no reliable and practical method can be designed against this mortal danger of concealment, then the time for the establishment of dependable controls did pass years ago. While it may be a useful propaganda device to talk about control schemes (which I rather doubt since the spreading of illusions usually backfires), nuclear international control never again can be a safe security measure. International control would be possible only as a sham and, if adopted, would constitute an extreme and unacceptable security hazard. This is the second fundamental fact which we must understand.

For that matter, the point is entirely academic. So long as the Soviet government retains its present structure and political intent, and wants to remain safely in power as a dictatorship, it cannot, and will not, accept an international control agreement. This is so because it cannot allow thousands of foreign inspectors to investigate Russian industry and possibly ferret out major Soviet secrets. International control, moreover, would mean the end of the iron curtain and hence signify the end of this most essential prop of Soviet political survival.

Our concern must center on the threat of an atomic war within the next ten to twenty years. It is unlikely (though, naturally, not impossible) that during this period the Soviet government will have changed enough to make it any more amenable to mutual supervision. Hence even the best conceived control scheme will not help us with our problem of avoiding nuclear warfare in the immediate future. It may be granted, however, that should the Soviet government change substantially within this crucial period, a new look at the problem could become useful. For the time being, discussions of safe nuclear disarmament schemes are, at best, useless or naive and, at worst, hypocritical or subversive. Soviet talk about control is designed to disarm the United States and enhance the nuclear posture of this is the third fact which we must always keep in mind.

It also has been proposed to forego involved control schemes. Instead, a simple



international agreement should be concluded, for example, in the form of a mutual promise never to use nuclear weapons. Proposals of this type are in fact a recognition that it is, objectively, to the interests of all to avoid nuclear war. Hence such a promise—it is alleged—would be undertaken in good faith by all states, at the risk of atomic perdition. To assume good faith in vital security matters is in flagrant contradiction to overwhelming historical evidence; as of the date of this writing, it cannot be shown plausibly that the advent of the new technology has invalidated the significance of historical precedent. To postulate that it would be against the interests of a potential aggressor not to use nuclear weapons, especially if other nations would have lived up to their word and would be unprepared for nuclear warfare, is hazardous to the point of advocating political suicide. The lack of proper nuclear capabilities in peaceful states would provide the aggressor with unparalleled opportunities for attack and with an historically unprecedented chance of all-inclusive victory. The atomic bomb is an attractive weapon for the bolshevik. It places him within arms' length of fulfilling what was before an unattainable pipedream: The destruction of the United States and the accomplishment of world revolution, regardless of Russia's survival or demise. The nuclear bomb inevitably will become the aggressor's weapon par excellence. While the historical Alexanders, Napoleons, and Hitlers were pitiable illusionists, the atomically armed future aggressor may be the greatest military realist of all times, and hence end up as the first true world conqueror in history. This possibility is the fourth fact of the nuclear era.

Agreements of any kind, and surely those dealing with key security matters, presuppose mutual trust. International agreements are, or should be, similar to those found in private life—they must not be entered into unless they are based on a calculable minimum of confidence. No sane businessman ever deals with a person whose credit rating is bad and who has a record of defaulting on his debts. If a promissory international nuclear agreement were concluded in the present situation, it would produce the strongest sense of insecurity and fear. For this reason alone, it probably would become inoperable.

No nation in its right mind would risk its security through destroying its atomic stockpile in reliance upon a mere diplomatic agreement. With large nuclear industries in existence, such a paper agreement could be broken easily and rapidly. Let us not forget that governments change and that few governments consider themselves bound by the promises of their predecessors. To have any security at all therefore, nations would have to retain readily usable nuclear weapons in their arsenals. There is no other insurance against breach of promise. But, then, we would be back at the point where we started, namely, at the existence of nuclear armaments. Naturally, it would be possible to conclude agreements limiting the number of nuclear weapons in the possession of each nation. Yet such agreements cannot be enforced in such a manner that violations would be made impossible; and presumably it would prove difficult to include in such agreements limitations on the number of defensive nuclear weapons.

No doubt, governments could pledge themselves not to use their nuclear weapons aggressively or offensively, and yet reserve the right to produce and maintain such weapons. It is conceivable that such an agreement would be kept. All that is necessary to make the agreement self-enforcing is the military situation in which the employment of nuclear weapons would be equally harmful to both sides, and in any event, extremely

harmful to the first user. If there were such a situation—which cannot be defined properly or predicted, and which hardly would be a realistic possibility—such an agreement would be superfluous: the belligerents anyway would act according to their best interests. By contrast, if there were a military situation in which it would be advantageous for one belligerent to initiate the employment of nuclear weapons, even at the price of retaliation, then in all likelihood the agreement would be disregarded. The chances are that, within the next 10 to 20 years, this latter rather than the former situation will prevail.

I will refrain from judging whether, at present, it would be advantageous for the United States to commit itself to the non-use of nuclear weapons. The fact is that the United States Government has not made such a commitment (as little as it ever committed itself to forego the use of toxic gases). The effective abolition of nuclear weapons undoubtedly would reduce the dangers of a surprise attack against North America and also protect American cities. But this advantage would have to be paid for dearly and cannot be obtained without heavy risk.

The proscription of nuclear weapons would be meaningful only if the Armed Forces in their entirety were reorganized to wage non-nuclear war. In order to protect its security in the absence of nuclear weapons, the United States would have to acquire an entirely different military establishment. Any surface strategy replacing present air strategy would suffer from fatal geographical handicaps or, to phrase it differently, to compensate for Russia's advantages in a surface war, an extraordinary military effort of the United States would be necessary. For example, to balance Soviet ground strength, in such a manner that further Russian advances in Eurasia would not be invited, American land forces would have to be tripled and supporting air and naval forces be enlarged substantially; possibly the Strategic Air Command (nonnuclear) also would have to be doubled or tripled. The adoption of a nonnuclear air strategy would require even greater efforts. The maintenance of so considerably larger forces must demand a military budget on the order of \$100 billion or more, and could not be done without compulsory military service, perhaps of 2 to 3 years' duration. Despite such an exertion, the security of key areas in Europe and Asia could not be guaranteed.

I do not know whether the United States can afford such a military outlay. I do know that long-lasting armaments of such a size would transform American society, and I doubt seriously that the United States soon would be inclined to arm on a \$100 billion scale during peacetime. If this doubt were justified, then the abandonment of nuclear weapons could spell only the defeat, and ultimately the Communist domination, of the United States. And yet, despite our nuclear forbearance, we could not be sure that the United States would be spared atomic attacks. Certainly, in the closing phases of war in which the U. S. S. R. achieved air mastery, the Soviets would not refrain from using atomic weapons against American targets if the American Nation otherwise would fall to surrender; or the Soviets might use those bombs to further their objective of liquidating hostile classes. For that matter, a parallel argument can be made for the Soviet nation: Without nuclear weapons, the Soviets never can hope to defeat the United States. Hence, they will accept proscribing atomic weapons only after they have abandoned first their objective of world revolution.

Without nuclear weapons, the United States would lose its military power, and hence the irreplaceable key to American security. This is the fifth fundamental fact of the nuclear problem.

We are all free to deplore the situation but we are unable to change it unless we are willing to concede victory to the Communists. The only way to avoid this, without resistance, indeed, has been proposed.

Such counsels of despair—if made in good faith—result from an improper analysis of the problem. Many of those who have been participating in the nuclear argument find it difficult to understand that, within the present world situation, the avoidance of nuclear catastrophe is a military and political task. The nuclear problem is not susceptible to solutions by legal agreement, nor by any other trick aiming at the evanescence of nuclear weapons. This is the sixth fact with which we must come to grips. It is true there is no guaranty, even if suitable military and political techniques were used skillfully, that there will be no nuclear devastation. Nor is there any guaranty that those techniques, in fact, will be used with dexterity and imagination. Since, however, there is no practical alternative solution, we must concentrate on the techniques which are available. If those who lose their time in chasing utopian butterflies could but devote some of their brainpower to the real problems before us, we might make some progress after all.

The military task, briefly, consists in maintaining armaments in such quantities and of such quality that the opponent of the United States will find it impossible to solve his military problem through the employment of nuclear weapons. More particularly, he must be prevented from knocking out the American retaliatory forces through surprise blows and delivering a substantial portion of his atomic stockpile on American targets. He also must be prevented from posing, as he does now, a unilateral nuclear threat to European and Asiatic countries. Once the various free nations have acquired quantities of nuclear explosives, the military problem becomes essentially a matter of delivery vehicles and defense systems, viz., of overall technological superiority, as well as of constant readiness and a gradual reduction of the vulnerability of cities and people.

This military problem is of major dimensions and it will continue to grow. I need add only that the American people and the peoples of other free nations have not yet understood fully the scope of their military responsibilities. I do not believe that in order to solve its military security problems, the United States will have to be turned into an "armed camp" (a cliché which many abuse to argue against proper preparedness), but the United States no longer can afford to have military budgets which fall far short of satisfying minimum requirements. Present American and allied armaments and technological programs have many gaps which any military expert can identify without difficulty. Insufficient forces in being and inadequate quantities of modern weapons, as well as poor command, alliance and decision-making structures which are not responsive to the requirements of rapid modern war, constitute an invitation to nuclear death, especially so since in a modern war the first battle may decide the outcome of the entire conflict. This is the seventh fact which we never should allow to be forgotten.

And we may immediately add the eighth fact that future wars hardly will be fought with weapons ordered and produced after the start of hostilities. Military and industrial mobilization after D-day is a concept which is not applicable to nuclear warfare. Hence, war potentials have lost much of their significance, while forces in being and weapons stockpiles have become of crucial importance. This means that one of the main military assets of the United States, i. e., its industrial superiority, no longer possesses its traditional significance. Current American military policies do not yet respond to this fundamental strategic change.

THE 14 FUNDAMENTAL FACTS OF  
THE NUCLEAR AGE

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, in the October 1954 issue of the Review of Politics, which is published by the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, there was published an article under the heading of "Courage or Perdition?—The 14 Fundamental Facts of the Nuclear Age," written by Ferreus.

Mr. President, from time to time articles which have great significance and great interest appear in various publications. I wish to ask at this time

unanimous consent that the article to which I have just alluded may be printed in the body of the Record. It deals with vital matters affecting the defense of our country.

I would particularly call the article to the attention of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the ranking members of those three committees. I think they will find the article challenging, and in due time and at an early date I believe they will want to explore some of the very basic questions raised, which vitally affect the security of the country.

Fundamentally, the article takes up the possibilities of an effective system of inspection relative to atomic energy. That question, of course, is of vital concern to this Government and to the American people, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union to date has rejected all proposals for effectively checking on atomic weapon development.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

COURAGE OR PERDITION?—THE 14 FUNDAMENTAL FACTS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE  
(By Ferreus)

However distasteful it may be, nuclear weapons, of the fission and fusion types have come to stay. Henceforth, they will be as much a part of human existence as rain and snow, morality and crime, the telephone and the airplane, pacifism and aggressiveness, freedom and tyranny, stupidity and wisdom. It is unlikely that this new invention can be undone except through the destruction of civilization itself. On the contrary, nucleonics sooner or later will provide the foundation of industrial civilization all over the globe. Given the anticipated increase in consumption of our energy resources, it appears that nuclear fuels, on a large scale, will have to be made available to industry within the life span of the present generation. Otherwise economic decline (and hence political catastrophe) must come about as the result of the gradual depletion of oil and coal deposits, the concurrent price rise of mineral fuels, the lack of a mineral energy basis in many countries, the rapidly rising demand for industrial goods, and the uninterrupted increase of population.

On a less cosmic scale, the continued progress of many individual industries is dependent, at least partially, upon the early utilization of nuclear techniques and materials. For example, the future of surface and possibly air transportation, of irrigation agriculture, and perhaps of the chemical and metallurgical industries, is interrelated with nuclear advances. Both energy needs and technological changes make it inevitable that large nuclear industries, including producers of fissile materials and atomic particles, will arise in presently industrialized countries. It is no less inevitable that such industries will grow in under-developed areas, because nuclear technology offers an unprecedented chance of cutting the time requirements for industrialization. Nucleonics are fast becoming a global necessity. Naturally, in a world where there are numerous installations using nuclear techniques, and where there are also many basic nuclear producers, there must be available manifold abilities to build nuclear weapons. The inevitability of the nucleonic age and the emergency of nuclear industrial potentials is the first fundamental fact which we must grasp firmly.



international agreement should be concluded, for example, in the form of a mutual promise never to use nuclear weapons. Proposals of this type are based on the assumption that it is, objectively, to the best interests of all to avoid nuclear war. Hence such a promise—it is alleged—would be undertaken in good faith by all states, at the risk of atomic perdition. To assume good faith in vital security matters is in flagrant contradiction to overwhelming historical evidence; as of the date of this writing, it cannot be shown plausibly that the advent of the new technology has invalidated the significance of historical precedent. To postulate that it would be against the interests of a potential aggressor not to use nuclear weapons, especially if other nations would have lived up to their word and would be unprepared for nuclear warfare, is hazardous to the point of advocating political suicide. The lack of proper nuclear capabilities in peaceful states would provide the aggressor with unparalleled opportunities for attack and with an historically unprecedented chance of all-inclusive victory. The atomic bomb is an attractive weapon for the bolshevik. It places him within arms' length of fulfilling what was before an unattainable pipedream: The destruction of the United States and the accomplishment of world revolution, regardless of Russia's survival or demise. The nuclear bomb inevitably will become the aggressor's weapon par excellence. While the historical Alexanders, Napoleons, and Hitlers were pitiable illusionists, the atomically armed future aggressor may be the greatest military realist of all times, and hence end up as the first true world conqueror in history. This possibility is the fourth fact of the nuclear era.

Agreements of any kind, and surely those dealing with key security matters, presuppose mutual trust. International agreements are, or should be, similar to those found in private life—they must not be entered into unless they are based on a calculable minimum of confidence. No sane businessman ever deals with a person whose credit rating is bad and who has a record of defaulting on his debts. If a promissory international nuclear agreement were concluded in the present situation, it would produce the strongest sense of insecurity and fear. For this reason alone, it probably would become inoperable and conceivably lead to war.

No nation in its right mind would risk its security through destroying its atomic stockpile in reliance upon a mere diplomatic agreement. With large nuclear industries in existence, such a paper agreement could be broken easily and rapidly. Let us not forget that governments change and that few governments consider themselves bound by the promises of their predecessors. To have any security at all therefore, nations would have to retain readily usable nuclear weapons in their arsenals. There is no other insurance against breach of promise. But, then, we would be back at the point where we started, namely, at the existence of nuclear armaments. Naturally, it would be possible to conclude agreements limiting the number of nuclear weapons in the possession of each nation. Yet such agreements cannot be enforced in such a manner that violations would be made impossible; and presumably it would prove difficult to include in such agreements limitations on the number of defensive nuclear weapons.

No doubt, governments could pledge themselves not to use their nuclear weapons aggressively or offensively, and yet reserve the right to produce and maintain such weapons. It is conceivable that such an agreement would be kept. All that is necessary to make the agreement work is to produce a military situation in which the employment of nuclear weapons would be equally harmful to both sides, and in any event, extremely

harmful to the first user. If there were such a situation—which cannot be defined properly or predicted, and which hardly would exist if the agreement were superfluous—the belligerents anyway would act according to their best interests. By contrast, if there were a military situation in which it would be advantageous for one belligerent to initiate the employment of nuclear weapons, even at the price of retaliation, then in all likelihood the agreement would be disregarded. The chances are that, within the next 10 to 20 years, this latter rather than the former situation will prevail.

I will refrain from judging whether, at present, it would be advantageous for the United States to commit itself to the non-use of nuclear weapons. The fact is that the United States Government has not made such a commitment (as little as it ever committed itself to forego the use of toxic gases). The effective abolition of nuclear weapons undoubtedly would reduce the dangers of a surprise attack against North America and also protect American cities. But this advantage would have to be paid for dearly and cannot be obtained without heavy risk.

The proscription of nuclear weapons would be meaningful only if the Armed Forces in their entirety were reorganized to wage non-nuclear war. In order to protect its security in the absence of nuclear weapons, the United States would have to acquire an entirely different military establishment. Any surface strategy replacing present air strategy would suffer from fatal geographical handicaps or, to phrase it differently, to compensate for Russia's advantages in a surface war, an extraordinary military effort of the United States would be necessary. For example, to balance Soviet ground strength, in such a manner that further Russian advances in Eurasia would not be invited, American land forces would have to be tripled and supporting air and naval forces be enlarged substantially; possibly the Strategic Air Command (nonnuclear) also would have to be doubled or tripled. The adoption of a nonnuclear air strategy would require even greater efforts. The maintenance of so considerably larger forces must demand a military budget on the order of \$100 billion or more, and could not be done without compulsory military service, perhaps of 2 to 3 years' duration. Despite such an exertion, the security of key areas in Europe and Asia could not be guaranteed.

I do not know whether the United States can afford such a military outlay. I do know that long-lasting armaments of such a size would transform American society, and I doubt seriously that the United States soon would be inclined to arm on a \$100 billion scale during peacetime. If this doubt were justified, then the abandonment of nuclear weapons could spell only the defeat, and ultimately the Communist domination, of the United States. And yet, despite our nuclear forbearance, we could not be sure that the United States would be spared atomic attacks. Certainly, in the closing phases of war in which the U. S. S. R. achieved air mastery, the Soviets would not refrain from using atomic weapons against American targets if the American Nation otherwise would fail to surrender; or the Soviets might use those bombs to further their objective of liquidating hostile classes. For that matter, a parallel argument can be made for the Soviet nation: Without nuclear weapons, the Soviets never can hope to defeat the United States. Hence, they will accept proscribing atomic weapons only after they have abandoned first their objective of world revolution. Nuclear weapons are the key of modern military power, and hence the irreplaceable key to American security. This is the fifth fundamental fact of the nuclear problem.

We are all free to deplore the situation but we are unable to change it unless we are willing to concede victory to the Communists without resistance as, indeed, has been proposed.

Such counsels of despair—if made in good faith—result from an improper analysis of the problem. Many of those who have been participating in the nuclear argument find it difficult to understand that, within the present world situation, the avoidance of nuclear catastrophe is a military and political task. The nuclear problem is not susceptible to solutions by legal agreement, nor by any other trick aiming at the evanescence of nuclear weapons. This is the stiff fact with which we must come to grips. It is true there is no guaranty, even if suitable military and political techniques were used skillfully, that there will be no nuclear devastation. Nor is there any guaranty that these techniques, in fact, will be used with dexterity and imagination. Since, however, there is no practical alternative solution, we must concentrate on the techniques which are available. If those who lose their time in chasing utopian butterflies could but devote some of their brainpower to the real problems before us, we might make some progress after all.

The military task, briefly, consists in maintaining armaments in such quantities and of such quality that the opponent of the United States will find it impossible to solve his military problem through the employment of nuclear weapons. More particularly, he must be prevented from knocking out the American retaliatory forces through surprise blows and delivering a substantial portion of his atomic stockpile on American targets. He also must be prevented from posing, as he does now, a unilateral nuclear threat to European and Asiatic countries. Once the various free nations have acquired quantities of nuclear explosives, the military problem becomes essentially a matter of delivery vehicles and defense systems, viz., of overall technological superiority, as well as of constant readiness and a gradual reduction of the vulnerability of cities and people.

This military problem is of major dimensions and it will continue to grow. I need add only that the American people and the peoples of other free nations have not yet understood fully the scope of their military responsibilities. I do not believe that in order to solve its military security problems, the United States will have to be turned into an "armed camp" (a cliché which many abuse to argue against proper preparedness), but the United States no longer can afford to have military budgets which fall far short of satisfying minimum requirements. Present American and allied armaments and technological programs have many gaps which any military expert can identify without difficulty. Insufficient forces in being and inadequate quantities of modern weapons, as well as poor command, alliance and decision-making structures which are not responsive to the requirements of rapid modern war, constitute an invitation to nuclear death especially so since in a modern war the first battle may decide the outcome of the entire conflict. This is the seventh fact which we never should allow to be forgotten.

And we may immediately add the eighth fact that future wars hardly will be fought with weapons ordered and produced after the start of hostilities. Military and industrial mobilization after D-day is a concept which is not applicable to nuclear war. Hence, war potentials have lost much of their significance, while forces in being and weapons stockpiles have become of crucial importance. This means that one of the main traditional superiorities, no longer possesses its traditional significance. Current American military policies do not yet respond to this fundamental strategical change.

True, the mere existence of nuclear industries of atomic weapons does not by itself constitute a security threat. This threat arises only when such weapons are placed in the hands of the politically immoral and uninhibited, and more particularly, in the hands of governments or political (and criminal) groups willing to employ such weapons for the blackmail or destruction of their opponents. It may be argued that, given governmental encouragement to the present tendency of society to decentralize, and given some efforts to reduce the vulnerability of factories and cities, the relative effectiveness of nuclear weapons could be reduced. It also may be argued that the employment of nuclear weapons could reduce war to a single battle of a few days' duration and that, while casualties in this battle would be very heavy, total casualties would be smaller than those resulting from a hypothetical protracted war fought without nuclear weapons. In comparison with wars of previous centuries, a nuclear war indeed need not be more destructive of human lives than, let us say, the Thirty Years' War (which, admittedly, would be scant solace). However, these arguments may be countered with equally and perhaps more, cogent objections. In the end, the disputants should agree easily that wars in general, and nuclear wars in particular, are most unpleasant occurrences which all of us must make strong efforts to avoid. Hence the question arises: granting the inevitable existence of nuclear capabilities are there feasible methods for avoiding a nuclear holocaust?

A nuclear monopoly in the hands of an aggressive dictator certainly would have spelled doom for much of mankind. If, by the end of the Second World War, Stalin had possessed such a monopoly in the form of a significant weapons stockpile, he would have been able to establish a Soviet world dominion; in all likelihood, he would have proceeded to do so. Or we may ask ourselves what might have happened if the Nazis had come into possession of an operational stockpile of atomic weapons prior to the Normandy invasion? Had not the United States achieved the first atomic stockpile in history, human society would have suffered the worst catastrophe in its history. Let us be grateful that this disaster was spared us.

If an aggressor were to use nuclear weapons in the future, he would do so in the expectancy of retaliation in kind. We probably are entitled to make some rationalistic assumption with respect to human nature, including the psychology of aggressors. If we assume then, that aggressors aim at the fruits of war but dare shoulder only the minimum of sacrifice, we should expect that in the face of a deadly retaliatory threat, aggressors might abstain from the employment of nuclear weapons. Yet this expectation cannot be firm because the aggressor may be able to neutralize, by military or political means, the capability or willingness of his opponents to retaliate; and secondly, because he may be a madman (in the clinical sense), and hence not be rationally mindful of the consequences of his acts—in fact, depopulation and the creation of ruin and chaos may be his primary objectives. Hence the concept that atomic attack is preventable through the threat of retaliation, while probably valid in general, cannot be relied upon in all and any circumstances.

There is a school of thought which denies that security against atomic destruction can be obtained at all through retaliatory threat. The fear is that retaliation would compound the evil. In different variants and mixtures, it is proposed that the supervised destruction of existing stockpiles and the establishment of an international control agency be undertaken in order to prevent the future production of nuclear weapons. Perpetual international control is the heart of this concept: its purpose is to make nuclear war

impossible through nuclear disarmament. There have been numerous schemes setting forth infallible and effective control arrangements. Ingenious ideas have been proposed to provide for the closing of the loopholes which, invariably, appeared after a particular scheme had been analyzed closely.

The drawing of utopias has been the favorite pastime of our nuclear Morus, Campanellas, and Bellamies. It is amazing that such cerebrations have arrested the attention of political scientists and even of practicing statesmen (if we assume their attention was genuine). No less startling is the fact that discussions about such schemes usually ignore the practical difficulties which would arise even in the unlikely event of an international agreement undertaken in truly good faith.

Let us look at three of these practical difficulties.

1. Effective atomic control probably would entail the direct watching of no less than 100,000 industrial firms and factories the world over; hence at least 300,000 technically qualified inspectors would have to be assigned to the control of existing facilities. In reality, this world-wide requirement would be considerably larger and in addition to supervising industrial enterprises it would be necessary to control many other economic activities, such as mining, trading, laboratory research, etc. I doubt that there are in the world enough technically—and linguistically—qualified persons to undertake such a task. (In the United States only 7,400 persons received master of arts and doctor of philosophy degrees in engineering and physical sciences during 1952.)

No elaborate statistics are necessary to show that commitment of such a corps of inspectors would swallow a large percentage of the world's scientists and technicians. While on control assignments, these men would be taken away from their primary professions. One can but picture the effect on future scientific progress. Yet if volunteers were not forthcoming in adequate numbers, personnel would have to be drafted, and this not just for a short emergency. The loyalty and the reliability of drafted inspectors probably would not rate very high. Since, actually, the world's entire technical economy must be supervised, literally every qualified citizen would have to become a part-time policeman. Even in this improbable case a modern state would possess enough resources and wits to outwit the honest inspectors, bribe the dishonest ones, blind the attention of the disaffected, and enlist the willing or forced cooperation of the ideologists and political careerists.

2. To avoid secret preparations in out-of-the-way places and uninhabited areas, approximately 30 million square miles would have to be supervised, with at least half of this area requiring frequent and close looks. This type of massive supervision can be done only through aerial reconnaissance. Assuming a range of aircraft of 1,000 miles and a photographic coverage per sortie of a 2-mile strip, 15,000 aircraft sorties would be necessary for a single supervision or if a weekly check is desired, as it must, about 780,000 sorties per year. This estimate neglects additional sorties necessitated by bad weather and the need to survey sea areas, and it does not take into account the responsibility of following up suspected violations with detailed checks and precision photography obtainable only through large numbers of low-level flights (and conceivably through airborne landings). With maintenance, repair, and loss, approximately 8,450 aircraft and about 2 million men as well as very substantial quantities of fuel and other resources would be required to do just the basic job. With all that investment and flying, it still would be possible—easily possible—to fool the air patrol: many infractions would be feasible in tunnels, underground installations, and even in innocent-looking city houses. Needless to say, such a global air patrol would deprive security of its major advantage—its secrecy. Hence the patrol can be instituted only after states no longer are required to have military and industrial secrets. If so, would the air patrol not be superfluous?

Future technology, however, may modify the above requirements for control figures. With better aircraft, enlarged airbase systems, and broader photographic coverage, the job may be done with fewer sorties. Substantial increases in commercial flying generally may restrict the area which needs to be controlled. Still, the cost of the inspectors corps and the air patrol may be estimated at approximately \$18 to \$20 billion yearly as compared to the current budget of the United Nations of less than \$50 million. Unquestionably, the United States would have to pay the lion's share of this budget. More significant perhaps, only the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom would be able to make available adequate air facilities and personnel for the purpose. The air patrol would be an almost exclusive responsibility of the super power. Let us be content with the remark that such a state of affairs would present very great political hazards.

3. Nuclear weapons already are in existence. Before an agreement conceivably can be negotiated, there will be large weapons stockpiles in many countries. How on earth can it be assured that all these weapons would be destroyed and the sizeable numbers of "insurance weapons" would not be hidden? Yet if no reliable and practical method can be designed against this mortal danger of concealment, then the time for the establishment of dependable controls must pass years ago. While it may be a useful propaganda device to talk about control schemes (which I rather doubt since the spreading of illusions usually backfires), nuclear international control never again can be a safe security measure. International control would be possible only as a sham and if adopted, would constitute an extreme and unacceptable security hazard. This is the second fundamental fact which we must understand.

For that matter, the point is entirely academic. So long as the Soviet government retains its present structure and political intent, and wants to remain safely in power as a dictatorship, it cannot, and will not, accept an international control agreement. This is so because it cannot allow thousands of foreign inspectors to investigate Russian industry and possibly ferret out major Soviet secrets. International control, moreover, would mean the end of the iron curtain and hence signify the end of this most essential prop of Soviet political survival.

Our concern must center on the threat of an atomic war within the next ten to twenty years. It is unlikely (though, naturally, not impossible) that during this period the Soviet government will have changed enough to make it any more amenable to mutual supervision. Hence even the best conceived control scheme will not help us with our problem of avoiding nuclear warfare in the immediate future. It may be granted, however, that should the Soviet government change substantially within this crucial period, a new look at the problem could become useful. For the time being, discussions of safe nuclear disarmament schemes are, at best, useless or naive and, at worst, hypocritical or subversive. Soviet international control is designed to disarm the

world of nuclear weapons. This is the third fact which we must always keep in mind. It also has been proposed to forego involved control schemes. Instead, a simple



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THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY  
OF ESTONIAN INDEPENDENCE

Mr. IVES. Mr. President, yesterday, February 24, marked the 37th anniversary of Estonian Independence Day. In joining my fellow Americans of Estonian descent in commemoration of this noteworthy event, I fervently hope that the reestablishment of a free Estonia is near. The forcible annexation of Estonia and her Baltic neighbors is a tragic reminder of the totalitarian imperialism of the Soviets. Although freedom in Estonia has fallen victim to the treacherous Communist tyranny, the gallant Estonian people remain firm in resisting their oppressors. Let us, on this anniversary, reaffirm our determination never to recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltic nations, and express our fervent hope and prayer for their speedy liberation.

Why present import duties on Japanese goods should not be reduced on this basis. In line with this goal, I ask unanimous consent that this petition, together with the names of the Members of the Senate and the Members of the House of Representatives who joined me in signing the petition, be printed in the body of the Record.

There being no objection, the petition, together with the list of signers, was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
February 9, 1959

The PRESIDENT,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We, the undersigned Members of Congress, acting on information we have received from the American Crab Packers Association which was presented in detail at hearings of the United States Tariff Commission and the Committee for Reciprocity Information last December, and without being influenced by our views on the tariff policy of the administration set forth in H. R. 1, do hereby petition you to instruct the proper authorities not to raise the present tariffs on imported crabmeat from Japan or other countries at the forthcoming conference of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to be held at Geneva, Switzerland. Our reasons in making this request are as follows:

- quest are as follows:
1. The present tariffs of 15 percent valorem on fresh and frozen crabmeat, 22½ percent ad valorem on canned crabmeat, have apparently not obstructed restricted the importations of such supplies as Japan, the principal producer, has available for export to this country, since imports of crabmeat from Japan have increased from 480,000 pounds in 1948 to 3,800,000 pounds in 1953, a gain of 700 percent. In 1953 we imported 95 percent of the crabmeat that Japan exported.
  2. Japanese crabmeat is now underselling the domestic in the United States market. The prices of the imported item are in keeping with the prices of other items of its class such as lobster and shrimp.
  3. No sales effort or advertising is being used to promote the sales of imported crabmeat. If this were done it is quite evident that the market would absorb a much larger volume at present price levels. But big supplies suddenly dumped into the market would sell only at sacrifice prices.
  4. It has been pointed out that, by the Potsdam Treaty, Russia took over 80 percent of Japan's crabbing grounds at the end of the last war. Our Government excluded Russian crab imports in 1951 because it was produced by slave labor. But Russia has tried repeatedly to enter the United States market with crabmeat via England and other free countries.
  5. Japan, to increase her crab production to an extent that would materially help her economically, must secure the supply she lost to Russia. Fishing concessions to Japan, involving a return of these crabbing grounds, is the ace which Russia holds in the trade negotiations that are now being proposed between these two countries. For such agreements reached, Japan will likely pay heavily and Russia will benefit.
  6. It was reported in a reliable London publication early last December and not contradicted since by the British Government, that five crab and salmon fleets supplied by the British Government, flying the British flag, were engaged in the exploitation of their Navy fish grounds by Japanese workers will fish the Bering Sea grounds in 1955. These reports as well as possible Russian and Japanese

The issue of the present world conflict is whether communism will be victorious or be destroyed. The hydrogen bomb has not changed this issue, not by one iota. If the desire for freedom were a variable dependent on the expected rate of casualties, we should not even attempt to fight. If, however, national and individual freedom is our highest political value, then we should do our best to keep casualties to a minimum—even in the country of our opponent—but we should not be deterred by the cost of the conflict; the cost of defeat and of loss of principle would be still higher.

We are living today twice as long as the generations who conquered freedom for us and established the foundations of good government. Our task is to preserve and improve freedom for ourselves and for our descendants and to bring freedom to those who still are enslaved. The way to solve a serious problem is not to distort or ignore it, but to handle it. To take all precautions which prudence imposes, to accept the irreducible risks, to bear the required responsibilities and to follow the dictates of one's conscience. To change before it is known, to become paralytic from fear and pessimism, and to abandon oneself to the visions of apocalyptic

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, at the present time in Geneva, Switzerland, the United States is taking part in tariff concession negotiations with the Japanese.

Among the items subject to tariff concessions in favor of the Japanese is crabmeat. The announcement last fall that our country would consider tariff reductions on imported Japanese crabmeat was met with grave concern by members of this young American industry. The crabmeat industry finds even present import duties on Japanese crabmeat inadequate to assure fair competition with the crabmeat industry of Japan on the American market.

The Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries as bounded by my State of Maryland and the Commonwealth of Virginia to the south, constitutes the largest crab meat producing area in our Nation, although substantial segments of this industry are also found along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and the Gulf of Mexico. If provided with reasonable protection from unfair competition of foreign nations where, as an example, workmen receive but a fraction of what they are paid in America, this young American industry will grow and continue to furnish employment opportunities for thousands of our countrymen and make it possible for all Americans to enjoy this fine seafood at fair and reasonable prices.

There are many factors which ably demonstrate why tariff concessions on Japanese crabmeat should not be made. The President, under existing statutes, has the final discretion in determining whether such concessions shall be granted.

In order that these factors may be appropriately illuminated, I have been joined by a number of my colleagues in the Senate and also in the House of Representatives in presenting a petition to President Eisenhower, setting forth the basic rea-

Politically, several different tasks have to be performed. There must be an effort to make all free nations understand that the dangers of atomic aggression are not to be met by paper promises, but only by painful security actions. There is further the task of inducing the free nations, including the United States, to acquire the ready military strengths they need. Third, there is the problem of convincing our allies and ourselves that we must sacrifice for our security and possibly accept economic hardship, in order to procure those weapon systems which are needed in a modern war rather than those which were needed half a generation ago. Phony security is the excessive hazard in the present phase of the nuclear age. This ninth fact of the period often has been willfully and perilously overlooked.

Such persuasions probably will not be feasible if they be done by words and dollars alone. Much more is needed. Let us mention the need, in many European countries, for a new concept of economy to bring about the transformation of old societies from paralytic structures, or at best slowly going concerns, into fast growing, open societies, in which discouragement and disaffection will give way to positive attitudes. It is at this point that nuclear technology, in its industrial applications, should be able to do wonders, not only because it will provide energy to areas where there are at present inadequate resources, but also because the establishment of new major industries must produce an economic upswing. The buildup of the nuclear and electrical industries could bring about a socioeconomic mutation which would result in a vast improvement in living standards and an easing, relatively speaking, of the armaments burden. An economic rebirth on a new technological basis would demonstrate that the disintegration of the old society has been halted and that progress again has become possible. Our 10th fundamental fact is that the industrial application of nuclear energy offers an excellent chance for the social strengthening of the free world. Lest the impression arise that no basic reforms are required in the United States, be it pointed out that there is an urgent need in this country to stimulate technological inventiveness and imagination and to bring about a more rapid exploitation of new inventions. To satisfy this need, undoubtedly, additional research funds may be required, but more important still would be the streamlining of overly long and constructed bureaucratic channels. American technological and industrial time lags are too long. This is the 11th fact to which we must pay attention.

The political task, of course, should include efforts to persuade Soviet leadership that it is unwise for them to pursue their goal of world domination after, and in spite of, the onset of the nuclear age: Unwise because nuclear technology has all but destroyed the last vestige of the Marxian argument that due to the scarcity of resources, the abolition of private ownership is the prerequisite for material well-being of all members of society; and unwise, further, because the continued pursuit of the revolutionary goal, in disregard of the dangers of nuclear war and of the unpopularity of the Soviet Government at home, may spell the doom of the Communist regime, regardless of what would happen to the free world.

Western statesmen should not tire in explaining and emphasizing those two points. If, ultimately, the Soviet Government were to accept those two propositions, a new era would have begun and unless a new aggressor were to arise, the danger of nuclear ruin ipso facto would have ended. Unfortunately, it is most probable that the Soviet Government, at least in the near future, will not accept the truth of those propositions and, partly for reasons of intellectual blindness, partly for reasons of its inability to

change its ideology which it needs to legitimize its rule, and partly because of the inertia of its power machine, will continue its domination. Hence, the threat of atomic devastation is posed anew.

In the absence of adequate powers of persuasion, the threat of nuclear aggression against the free world can be eliminated only if the Soviet Government is changed or replaced. An alternate, though less conclusive solution, would involve a substantial retraction of the Soviet power orbit. Shall we consider the need to weaken, modify, or replace the Soviet Government to be the 12th basic fact of the nuclear age?

An effective liberation policy appears as one of the few alternatives to continued life in the shadow of nuclear death, with its expensive and growing demands for constant military readiness. It is true that a policy of liberation in and by itself poses the threat of atomic conflict, the important difference being, however, that an initiative policy by the free world would make it impossible for the aggressor to rig the game entirely in his favor and to create situations which would be most favorable to his plans of attack. If the would-be aggressor were kept off balance and forced to busy himself with his own defenses rather than with offensive plans, the threat of atomic devastation might be diminished.

In the nuclear age, political and military initiative is an indispensable prerequisite of security, while loss of initiative poses insoluble problems. The term "initiative" is not used here as a circumlocution for preventive war. Hundreds of initiatives are possible without resort to military conflict. As an example of a successful American initiative, we may recall the decision to acquire the hydrogen bomb before the Soviet Union. However, the time may come when a dispassionate survey of the security problems of the free world would indicate that these problems cannot be solved except through the deliberate resort to force. We should hope that such a moment never will come. But we must remember that in order to secure our safety without an offensive strategy, our military posture would have to be strengthened considerably and that, conversely, if no such strengthening occurs, the fateful decision may become inevitable. It is easy to pronounce cliché opinions about this grave problem and to take pleasure in pointing out that preventive war is logical nonsense: War cannot be fought to prevent war. True; but war can, and occasionally must be fought to prevent disaster and perdition. Only one thing is worse than nuclear war: Defeat in such a war. And this is the 13th fact to which I wish to call attention.

Article I, section 10, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the United States anticipated the need of initiative and offensive security actions in case of "imminent danger as will not admit of delay." If such dangers occur, the States may "engage in war . . . without the consent of Congress." So long as the United States clings to the concept that under no possible circumstance will it initiate war, not even while the opponent is preparing to strike, so long the initiative will remain in Soviet hands. In the seven generations of its existence, the United States has waged quite a number of wars and in every one of them—this possibly includes World War II—the United States faced up to the ineluctable decision and initiated hostilities on its own volition. There is absolutely no factual basis for the contention that democracy abhors war. The very nature of democracy demands that it accept its responsibilities and that, while it should not seek war lightly and do everything to avoid conflict, it should not shrink from the destruction of the democratic system. Has it not become apparent now that the world would be a better place—and

that many millions of innocent human beings still would be alive—if Hitler had been stopped between 1933 and 1935? The danger of atomic aggression has proved to be unmanageable, excessively costly and utterly destructive.

No doubt, in the nuclear era, a war decision is of far graver import than a similar decision before 1945. Personally, I never would favor a war decision unless there is a clear, urgent, and immediate need to anticipate and forestall attack with no other solution being available, and unless there is no other way to avoid a clearly inevitable war at a later date and under significantly more unfavorable circumstances.

However, looking back at my own reactions of 20 years ago, I remember arguing, too, that war should be waged against Hitler only under conditions of extreme necessity. But was that policy so wise? Was it not based on the invalid assumption that the Nazi regime was unstable? Did this policy not provide Hitler with many trumps and allow him to outflank his opponents? Maybe the ideals of pacifism are so lofty that the price which we had to pay—and which in the end possibly will have included a future world war III—was not too high. But again, was it such a good idea to refuse paying the relatively small price required to hold China during 1947 and 1949, seize North Korea in 1950, and liquidate Communist China after it actually had attacked United States forces? Far from embracing preventive war, the United States adopted a strategy of not fighting back and of deliberately averting its own victory. What did this new departure in militant peacefulness save for us in South-east Asia? What will it have saved for us after Communist China and Russia will have developed modern industries and combined their military resources? Clearly, do we not have a policy of avoiding the smaller and easier wars to make the big and costly wars ever more inevitable? In any event, in proclaiming good intentions of peacefulness with respect to future wars we are forced to look hard at the 14th fact of the atomic age which, perhaps, is the most ominous of all: That in an atomic conflict the force which plans to strike second never may be in a position to strike at all.

In the discharge of its security duties toward itself, its allies, and toward the free world, the United States must seize the political initiative. Yet, this initiative cannot be seized so long as the opponent knows that the United States does not mean it seriously and will shrink away from the ultimate consequence. The United States also may have to seize the military initiative, but nothing effective can be done in either field so long as the opponent is allowed to count upon his double ability to determine the timing of the war and to strike the first blow. No sustained and successful American initiative is possible while the by far most important decision is left in Soviet hands.

Without vigorous initiative, there can be no liberation, nor can the Soviets be dissuaded from their clearly avowed aggressive intentions. Yet, unless this Soviet objective of world domination is eliminated, there is no real chance of avoiding war; and, naturally, unless the basic military initiatives are in free world hands, there will be no protection against devastation, loss of life and defeat, nor preservation of free institutions and democracy. We may get away with a policy of the least effort, but only if our opponent is thoroughly frightened by what we can do to him after we received his first blows. It is in the nature of atomic war that he has no overwhelming reason to be excessively frightened.

To sum it all up: We have a policy to avoid war, but we have not achieved it. This—the danger of war is becoming ever more unmanageable. To keep the military situation under control and to preserve our democratic

institutions, we shall have to make a stand at some time. On the basis of the record of the years 1933 to 1954, we can say confidently that the sooner and the firmer the United States will make this stand, the easier the task will be and the greater the chance of forestalling atomic warfare.

The world is full of unprecedented dangers. We may argue about the means by which the dangers could be overcome, if such means were utilized. But we should realize that, in all probability, the dangers will persist. It is easy to predict the doom of our civilization and quite unrewarding to propose concrete—and costly and unpopular—military and political measures aiming to insure the survival of that civilization. I cannot help feeling, however, that this civilization is a spiritual force and, therefore, not susceptible to physical destruction. In any event, it cannot survive if the people who live under its blessings display a deplorable weakness of conviction and lack the ethos of courage. Nor can this civilization survive if its intellectual elites, fearful of risk, effort, and self-assertion, advise collective political suicide. This is a statement which can be supported with historical evidence and which I intend to be an objective proposition. I realize that the advocacy of suicide is not always intentional and that praiseworthy desires often are the midwives of deadly proposals.

I would like to add, and say it clearly, that I have nothing but contempt for those who are willing to surrender to communism in order to avoid nuclear war and thus to assure the physical survival and the enslavement of the maximum number. If such a spirit were typical of the free society, our civilization would be dead now. I do not believe that doom is near, let alone that it has come. But I am worried that the voices of cowardice are heard far more often than the voices of determination. I, too, want my family and my friends to survive and I do want to live to the end of my natural days. Everyone has the instinctive animal fear of death. But it hardly pays to survive for the blessings of a slave existence and it will be intolerable to purchase survival through the betrayal of value and conscience. Policies cannot be based just on the instinct of self-preservation. Do intellectuals and politicians have a lesser moral obligation than the simple private of whom they expect that he sacrifice himself when ordered into battle? Our entire society has been pushed into mortal conflict. In some way, most of us are now manning a battle station. Must we not be true to our duties?

The issue of the present world conflict is whether communism will be victorious or be destroyed. The hydrogen bomb has not changed this issue, not by one iota. If the desire for freedom were a variable dependent on the expected rate of casualties, we should not even attempt to fight. If, however, national and individual freedom is our highest political value, then we should do our best to keep casualties to a minimum—even in the country of our opponent—but we should not be deterred by the cost of the conflict; the cost of defeat and of loss of principle would be still higher.

We are living today twice as long as the generations who conquered freedom for us and established the foundations of good government. Our task is to preserve and improve freedom for ourselves and for our descendants, and to bring freedom to those who still are enslaved. The way to solve a serious problem is not to distort or ignore it, but to handle it; to take all precautions which prudence imposes, to accept the irreducible risks, to bear the required responsibilities and to follow the dictates of one's conscience. To cringe before the enemy, to bewail fate even before it is known, to become a passive victim of fate, and to abandon oneself to the visions of apocalyptic

horror is despicable. It is moral self-destruction to which atomic devastation would add little but physical confirmation and merited punishment.